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  This paper examines the role of the life cycle in impacting the distribution of a combined in-
come and wealth measure using data from the 2001 and 2006 Agricultural Resource Manage-
ment Survey. Such an assessment is made using both graphical representation of the distribu-
tion of the well-being measure along with utilization of the social welfare decomposition pro-
cedure. Results show a mild yet statistically insignificant improvement in the distribution of 
the economic measure over the five-year period. Contribution to social welfare is found high-
est among the cohort where the age of the head of household is between 45 and 54 years. Tar-
geted programs are found to enhance social welfare if they are aimed towards cohorts where 
the age of the head of household is younger than 35 years or where the age of the head of 
household is in the 35-to-44 age group, depending on whether the analysis is based on a per-
farm household or on a per-capita basis. 
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An important aspect of the well-documented di-
versity of U.S. farm households is the strong in-
fluence of operators’ life-cycle stages.
1 House-
hold resource allocation decisions are, in part, 
determined by a person’s age and family circum-
stances—the factors that shape their life cycle. 
These consumption, savings, labor allocation, and 
production choices are ultimately reflected in two 
key financial measures: household earnings and 
wealth. Farm policy has, for many years, ad-
vanced as a goal the notion of maintaining in-
comes of farmers due to the highly risky nature of 
agriculture production. As a result, most assess-
ments of farm household well-being and resulting 
policy prescriptions have relied on the distribu-
tion of farm household income and comparisons 
with other household groups. Since the inception 
of price and income support programs over 70 
years ago, a key stimulus for legislative action 
has been disparity between the income of farm 
and non-farm households (Gardner 1992, Houth-
akker 1967). 
  Recent evidence from the USDA’s 2006 Agri-
cultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS) 
shows that, on average, the incomes of farm 
households ($76,224), except for those whose 
operators are 65 years or older, tend to exceed by 
nearly 15 percent the incomes of all U.S. house-
holds ($66,570). This trend of incomes of farm 
households exceeding the incomes of all U.S. 
households was established in the early 1990s, 
with the incomes of households operated by ei-
ther farmers aged 35 years or younger or by 
farmers older than 65 being the exception. The 
fact that the farm households are no longer eco-
nomically disadvantaged in comparison to their 
counterpart in the general population as evi-
denced by the closing of their income gap, with 
the exception of those farm households operated 
by either younger or older operators, has implica-
tions for targeting policies aimed at income stabi-
lization as well as redistribution. 
  The life-cycle hypothesis of savings proposes 
that household savings and consumption reflect 
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1 The term “life cycle” refers to the various stages through which a 
person passes during a lifetime. The concept provides a coherent link-
age between an individual’s consumption patterns and expectations on 
income and savings as the individual passes from childhood, through 
education, training, labor participation, and retirement. For farm opera-
tors, it can trace the stages of the farm business from entry into farm-
ing, growth of the farm, consolidation, and retirement and transfer of 
the business to the next generation.  126    October 2009  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
the life-cycle stage of the household, and that 
consumption is a linear function of available cash 
and the discounted value of future income (Ando 
and Modigliani 1963, Modigliani 1986). A study 
by Kotlikoff and Summers (1981), however, 
challenged the traditional view that life-cycle 
saving is the dominant source of capital accumu-
lation by noting that the bulk of accumulated 
wealth is due to bequests and intergenerational 
transfers instead. Assuming that income will in-
crease during working years and decline at re-
tirement (see Paglin 1975, Kearl and Pope 1983, 
Ahearn, Perry, and El-Osta 1993, Pudney 1993), 
farm households tend to borrow when they are 
young, save during middle age, and spend down 
during retirement. So at any point in time, income 
and wealth differences among farm households 
can be attributed to their relative position in the 
life cycle. 
  It has been the contention of many economists 
that agricultural policy would be better informed 
if the assessment of economic well-being consid-
ered both income and wealth in the context of the 
life cycle (Mishra et al. 2002). A study by Hill 
(2002) points out that wealth is important not 
only because it generates income in a variety of 
forms, but also because it provides security, free-
dom to maneuver resources, and economic and 
political power. Until recently, data limitations 
precluded this type of comprehensive approach. 
ARMS has evolved to become the most extensive 
annual national resource for farm business and 
household economics along with capturing key 
demographic information pertaining to the farm 
operator household. Using two time periods (2001 
and 2006) that represent the latter years of a farm 
bill, and data from ARMS, this paper seeks pri-
marily to examine the inequality in the distribu-
tion of a composite measure of economic well-
being (CWB) that combines annualized wealth 
and the money income of U.S. farm households.
2 
Because the goal of policymakers is to increase 
both equity and efficiency (see OECD 1998), the 
analysis also aims for the decomposition of eco-
nomic disparity and of the social welfare function 
                                                                                    
2 The two farm bills that underlie this paper in terms of their impact 
on the income and asset values of farm households are the 1996 
Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act and the 
Farm Security and Rural Investment Act (FSRIA). For more specific 
information on the associated wealth effects of government payments, 
see Orden (2003) and Burfisher and Hopkins (2004). 
in the context of the life cycle. As farmers begin 
to advance in age, they tend to become less de-
pendent on farm earnings for their livelihood 
(Mishra et al. 2002). In addition, they begin to 
shift to less labor- and capital-intensive produc-
tion, and in fact may also begin to reduce the size 
of their operation by renting or selling part of 
their assets to younger, more productive operators 
(Gale 1994). Because of this, older farmers tend 
to have different income-generating strategies and 
different portfolios of farm assets than younger 
farmers, which, in and by itself, furthers the need 
for incorporating the life-cycle effects when ex-
amining the disparity in economic well-being 




Assessing how best to model the size distribu-
tions of economic units, both theoretically and 
empirically, has received much attention in the 
literature since the work of early economists and 
of social statisticians. Dagum (1980, 1999), for 
example, refers to the early 1800s work by David 
Ricardo, which dealt with, among other things, 
income distributions among owners of factors of 
production, while Kleiber and Kotz (2003) point 
to the work of Vilfredo Pareto on the modeling of 
personal income and of wealth distributions over 
100 years ago. A graphical representation of in-
equality of income and/or wealth distributions 
along with the introduction of a summary statistic 
based on this work were introduced by, respec-
tively, the American economist Max Lorenz and 
the Italian statistician Corrado Gini. 
  Since the pioneering work of these classical 
economists and social scientists, and particularly 
over the last fifty years, studies on the distribution 
of income and wealth have continued to be intro-
duced. While some of these studies had a similar 
yet more advanced utilization of the concept of 
inequality, others had a notable shift in emphasis. 
Examples of research with a broader economic 
and statistical implementation of the concept of 
inequality are those by Singh and Maddala 
(1976), Dagum (1977), Atkinson and Harrison 
(1978), Champernowne and Cowell (1998), and 
Sen (1997). Biancotti (2006) points to investiga-
tions by Kuznets (1955) and Kaldor (1956) where 
the focus of the research was on within-country 
inequality and its link to growth, either assessing El-Osta and Morehart  Welfare Decomposition in the Context of the Life Cycle of Farm Operators   127 
 
 
how economic disparities impact development, or 
explaining the pattern of inequality in any single 
economy that may result as a consequence of 
progress. The specific proposition of Kuznets’ 
model, which was shown to be more suitable for 
developing economies, is that economic growth 
can push up inequality before ultimately causing 
it to fall. A model by Okun (1975), which is 
deemed more adequate for developed economies 
(Burtless 2002), points to a potential sacrifice in 
efficiency when such economies enact regulatory 
schemes or income distribution programs tailored 
at ensuring equity in the final distribution of in-
come. 
  While many researchers have examined the 
inequality in the distribution of either income or 
wealth of agricultural households using the con-
cept of the Gini coefficient, the literature is scant 
when it comes to similar work for a combined 
income and wealth measure. Studies by Larson 
and Carlin (1974) and by Ahearn, Johnson, and 
Strickland (1985), for example, examined the 
economic well-being of farm households in the 
United States by assessing the extent of disparity 
in the size distributions of income and/or wealth. 
Findeis and Reddy (1987) and Reddy, Findeis, 
and Hallberg (1988) measured the inequality in 
the distribution of income for farm families, by 
region, using the 1995 Current Population Sur-
vey. Boisvert and Ranney (1990) measured in-
come inequality for New York dairy farmers us-
ing the concept of the Gini coefficient with ad-
justment for the presence of negative incomes. 
Gould and Saupe (1990) assessed the disparity of 
a combined income and wealth measure for farm-
ers using Wisconsin panel data. El-Osta, Bernat, 
and Ahearn (1995) extended the previous studies 
by exploring specifically the impact of govern-
ment payments and off-farm work on income 
inequality using data from the 1991 Farm Costs 
and Returns Survey. Other studies by El-Osta and 
Morehart (2002) and by El-Osta and Mishra 
(2005) examined, using ARMS data, the role of 
value judgments concerning society’s level of 
aversion to wealth concentration and the role of 
farm subsidies on wealth dispersion among farm 
households. 
  For the purpose of this study, the disparity in 
the economic well-being among farm households 
is first examined using the whole distribution of 
the combined income and wealth index, which is 
done in the form of distributing the shares of this 
index based on its quintiles and by time period. 
Next, the corresponding Lorenz curves (both or-
dinary and generalized) are plotted and the con-
cept of the Gini coefficient is utilized in order to, 
respectively, provide graphical representation of 
inequality and provide a corresponding single 
summary statistic of dispersion for each of the se-
lected groups of households.
3 Resulting statistics 
are then used to derive social welfare functions, 
which, in turn, are disaggregated in order to allow 
for the discernment of the contribution of five age 
cohorts towards overall welfare disparity. This 
method of decomposing welfare disparity, which 
was developed by Podder (1993) and later ap-
plied by Mukhopadhaya (2002), can help policy-
makers by identifying which age cohort might 
benefit the most from a targeted economic policy 
aimed at reducing disparity in the overall distri-
bution of economic well-being. 
 
Data and Measurement 
 
Pertinent data from the 2001 and 2006 ARMS 
were used to create the samples of farm operator 
households.
4 ARMS is a national survey con-
ducted annually by the Economic Research Ser-
vice and the National Agricultural Statistics Ser-
vice. Each observation in the ARMS’ sample of 
size  n   represents a number of similar farms, the 
particular number being the survey expansion 
factor [or the inverse of the probability of the sur-
veyed farm being selected for surveying, also 
known as survey weight (Wj, where j = 1, … , 
n  )]. As Table 1 shows, the expanded number of 
                                                                                    
3 Using income as an example, the ordinary Lorenz (OL) curve is 
obtained by plotting the cumulative proportion of the income of the 
population (y axis) against the cumulative proportion of the population 
(x axis), ranked by income. The generalized Lorenz curve (GL), due 
independently to Kakwani (1980) and Shorrocks (1983), is obtained by 
scaling OL by the mean (µ) of the income distribution, causing each 
value on the y axis to represent the levels of income, and the highest 
point on this axis to be µ. The Gini coefficient, which is a statistical 
construct, is related to the ordinary Lorenz curve in that it is equal to 
twice the area between the curve itself and a 45-degree line, also re-
ferred to as the “egalitarian line,” in a graph that has axes y and x. 
Among two ordinary Lorenz curves, the one curve which is every-
where closer to the 45-degree line than another, its corresponding 
distribution is judged unambiguously less unequal. 
4 The households in the samples are those of the principal farm 
operators who make the day-to-day management decisions. What are 
not included in these samples are those farm households whose farms 
are organized as non-family corporations or cooperatives, and farms 
where the majority of the farm ownership is not held by family 
members. 128    October 2009  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics by Age Categories (2001 and 2006) 
  Age of operator (years) 
Item  Younger than 35   35 to 44  45 to 54  55 to 64  65 or older  All 
 2001 
Sample  size  282  996 1,715 1,289 1,157 5,439 
Population  140,852  396,679 582,961 455,333 516,094  2,091,919 
Population  share  (%)  6.7  19.0 27.9 21.8 24.7  100.0 
         
Averages  ($)         
 Household  income  62,384  81,944 78,839 79,036 56,841 72,936 
 Marketable  wealth  4,078  6,722*  11,278 20,477 34,626 17,692 
 CWB  measure  66,462  88,667 90,117 99,513 91,467 90,628 
         
Shares  (%)         
 Household  income  93.9  92.4 87.5 79.4 62.1 80.5 
 Marketable  wealth  6.1  7.6 12.5 20.6 37.9 19.5 
 CWB  measure  100/0  100/0 100/0 100/0 100/0 100/0 
         
CWB  share  (%)  4.9  18.6 27.7 23.9 24.9  100.0 
         
Average  age  29  40 49 59 73 54 
Average  household  size  2.90  3.96 3.06 2.26 2.01 2.73 
 2006 
Sample  size  295  857 1,829 1,917 1,559 6,457 
Population  91,764  235,381 540,984 592,709 561,698  2,022,535 
Population  share  (%)  4.5  11.6 26.7 29.3 27.8  100.0 
         
Averages  ($)         
 Household  income  76,915  82,092 84,901 80,276 61,018 76,224 
 Marketable  wealth  9,613  16,078 20,096 33,142 55,050 32,683 
 CWB  measure  86,528  98,170 104,997 113,418 116,068 108,907 
         
Shares  (%)         
 Household  income  88.9  83.6 80.9 70.8 52.6 70.0 
 Marketable  wealth  11.1  16.4 19.1 29.2 47.4 30.0 
 CWB  measure  100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
         
CWB  share  (%)  3.6  10.5 25.8 30.5 29.6  100.0 
         
Average  age  30  40 50 59 73 57 
Average  household  size  3.24  3.96 3.15 2.29 1.95 2.67 
Source: Authors’ calculations and Agricultural and Resource Management Survey (2001 and 2006). 
Note: 
* indicates that the coefficient of variation is greater than 25 and less than or equal to 50. “CWB” is composite measure of 
economic well-being. 
farm households in 2001 and 2006 totaled 2.09 
million and 2.02 million, respectively. The table 
provides evidence that the loss of about 70,000 
farm households, in the span of 5 years, may be 
attributable, to a large extent, to the shrinkage in 
the proportion of households operated by farmers 
younger than 55 years old when entry rates into 
farming by young farmers is on the decline (see 
Hoppe 2002). A similar trend was found by Gale 
(2003), who reported a steady decline between El-Osta and Morehart  Welfare Decomposition in the Context of the Life Cycle of Farm Operators   129 
 
 
1978 and 1997 in both the number of young 
farmers entering farming and the number of older 
farmers exiting farming. The table also shows that 
about 47 percent of the farmers in 2001 are 55 
years old or older, with the proportion of older 
farmers rising in 2006 to 57 percent, along with 
the increase in the average age of farmers be-
tween the two time periods from 54 to 57, point-
ing to the continued trend, as was noted by Gale 
(2002), of the graying of the farm population. In 
terms of the relative economic position in the life 
cycle, while Table 1 shows an inverted U-shaped 
income-age profile, it nevertheless shows an in-
creasing linear trend in marketable wealth across 
all age sub-groups in both 2001 and 2006. 
 
Economic Well-Being Measure 
 
Using income alone as a measure of well-being is 
problematic since two individuals with the same 
income but with different amounts of wealth will 
have different consumption potential, and differ-
ent ability to weather unexpected financial shocks 
(see Burkhauser, Butler, and Wilkinson 1985, 
Crystal and Shea 1989, Wolff 1995, Johnson and 
Wahl 2004). This paper adjusts for the limitation 
of considering only income in examining the ine-
quality in economic well-being of farm operator 
households by using a combined income-wealth 
measure—similar to what has been proposed ini-
tially by Weisbrod and Hansen (1968) and reaf-
firmed later by Hill (2002). Accordingly, let the 
following define this composite measure of eco-
nomic well-being for each household: 
 
(1)    ( ) ,
[1 (1 ) ]
j jj j l
r






where  tc represents a proportional adjustment 
factor reflecting transaction costs, l is the life ex-
pectancy of the unit, r is an assumed interest rate 
set at 4 percent for this paper, and HHMIj and 
MNWj represent the jth total household’s money 
income and marketable net worth, respectively.
5 
                                                                                    
5 Total household’s money income (HHMIj) is the sum of earnings of 
the farm household from farming and from off-farm activities. Farm 
earnings is the sum of the operator household’s share of net farm 
business income (less depreciation) and wages paid to the operator. 
Off-farm earnings include incomes from wages and salaries, off-farm 
self employment, interest, dividends, private pensions, Social Security, 
veterans’ benefits, and other public programs. Marketable wealth 
  Next, an adjusted per-capita equivalent concept 
of composite measure of well-being (
*
j CWB ) is 








ε = , 
 
where S and ε (01 ≤ ε≤ ) are, respectively, the 
number of household members and the elasticity 
of household “need” (also referred to as the elas-
ticity of the scale rate) with respect to household 
size (see Burkhauser, Smeeding, and Merz 1996, 
Daly and Royer 2000). 
 When  ε is 1, this is the per-capita notion of 
*
j CWB and it indicates the presence of no econo-
mies of scale. This value of ε assumes that a 
household of two members requires twice as 
much in combined income and annualized wealth 
as a household with just one to be as equally well 
off. When ε is 0, this is the per-household notion 
of 
*
j CWB where economies of scale are assumed 
perfect, and where no adjustment according to the 
size of the household is made. This level of elas-
ticity assumes that a household with two, three, or 
even an infinite number of individuals can live 
equally well off the income-wealth combination 
as can a single person household with no increase 
in CWB. When ε is between 0 and 1, this implies 
a certain level of economies of scale, which 
grows smaller as ε increases. 
  In this paper, ε is valued at 0, 0.5, and 1, with 
these levels being used to provide a sort of sensi-
tivity analysis of the main results to the choice of 
ε. In addition, setting ε = 0.5 is done here in ac-
cordance with other studies, aimed at allowing for 
comparisons of economic well-being of house-
________________________________________________________
(MNW), a term used by Wolff (1995, p. 59), is defined as the current 
market value of all fungible assets (farm and non-farm) less the current 
value of (farm and non-farm) debts. Assets would include owner-
occupied housing, bank accounts and certificates of deposit, corporate 
stocks, and other types of financial assets. In the case of farm assets, 
they would include those that were marketable in the short run and that 
would not alter the expected returns from farming. The sale of land as 
a productive asset would change the production possibilities and 
potential income to the household from farming and thus was not 
included as part of marketable farm assets. Marketable farm invento-
ries of crops and livestock would also be included. This measure there-
fore considers only those assets that are easily converted to cash and 
purposely exclude farm production assets and household durable 
goods. An additional consideration in determining the income stream 
from marketable wealth is transaction-cost adjustment, tc. To more 
accurately portray the annuity, some allowance (or subtraction from 
MNW) must be made for costs incurred in the disposal of assets, set 
here at 2 percent, which gives factor tc a value of 0.98. 130    October 2009  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
holds with different sizes (see Gottschalk 1993, 




A popular way to measure inequality is to utilize 
the concept of “size distribution,” where the popu-
lation and the underlying economic variate are 
typically divided into quintiles or deciles. In this 
paper, a graphical representation of the size distri-
bution of 
*
j CWB  is presented for a farm house-
hold (i.e., ε = 0) over the 2001 and 2006 time 
periods based on weighted 
*
j CWB  quintiles. A 
limiting aspect of this method of measuring in-
equality is that it can only provide information 
about points in the 
*
j CWB distribution rather than 
capture inequality based on the entire distribution. 
Use of a graphical yet “ordinal” representation of 
the whole distribution based on the concept of the 
Lorenz curve (“ordinary” or “generalized”), or a 
summary statistic based on the concept of the 
Gini coefficient particularly when measured in 
conjunction with the Lorenz curve, provides the 
means to remedy this shortcoming. 
 Let  12 ,,, n x xx x =  "  describe the finite distri-
bution of CWB
* where  0 i x ≥  and where  12 , x x ≤  
..., . n x ≤ 
6 Let also u = k /n ( 0,1, , kn =  " ), and 
let the share of total CWB
* received by the  / kn   × 
100 percent poorest households be represented by 
L(u). Accordingly, the ordinary Lorenz curve of 
*
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− ϕ  is the quantile function defined as the 
inverse of the cumulative distribution function, ϕx, 
and where µx is the sample’s expected value of x. 
  Among two nonintersecting Lorenz curves of 
distributions A and B, for example, if the one de-
picting distribution A is everywhere above that of 
                                                                                    
6 While the concept of the Lorenz curve imposes a non-negativity 
restriction on the economic variable of interest, many studies (see 
Amiel, Cowell, and Polovin 1996, Jenkins and Jantti 2005) neverthe-
less assert the appropriateness to continue with the required monoto-
nicity assumption in the presence of negative values. In this study, 
while the presence of negative values of 
*
j CWB  is not considered ex-
cessive, it is however considerably more prevalent in 2001 than in 
2006 (4.55 percent and 3.25 percent of all the weighted samples, 
respectively). 
B, the distribution corresponding to the upper 
curve A is said to Lorenz “strongly” dominate the 
distribution representing the lower curve B 
[Bishop, Formby, and Thistle 1992, Deaton 2000 
(p. 159)]. The distribution of A is said to Lorenz-
dominate the distribution of B if its corresponding 
Lorenz curve lies everywhere above the corre-
sponding Lorenz curve of B, except for portions 
of both A’s and B’s where both of the corre-
sponding Lorenz curves touch. In both situations, 
distribution A is unambiguously less unequal than 
distribution B. However, Lorenz domination does 
not allow for a complete ranking of distributions 
A and B if their corresponding Lorenz curves do 
intersect. This limitation of the concept of the 
Lorenz curve to provide full ranking of distribu-
tions is circumvented by a scaling of the distribu-
tions by their corresponding means, which results 
in yet a more useful concept known as the “gen-
eralized” Lorenz curve, GLX  (u), as in the fol-




 0 () .   () ()      [ 0 , 1 ]
u
xx x x GL u L u t dt u
− =µ = ϕ ∈= ∫ . 
 
  Unlike the concept of the ordinary Lorenz 
curve, which allows for ranking of distributions 
only in terms of inequality, GLx (u), which was 
originally yet independently introduced by Kak-
wani (1980) and by Shorrocks (1983), allows for 
social welfare ranking of distributions. If the Lo-
renz curves of distributions C and D, with means 
µC and µD, are intersecting, and if µC is greater 
than  µD and is large enough to “lift” its cor-
responding distribution higher and clear of that of 
D, then distribution C is said to dominate dis-
tribution D according to the generalized Lorenz 
criterion, but not according to the Lorenz crite-
rion (Deaton 2000, p. 159). Accordingly, distribu-
tion C is considered more favorable than distribu-
tion D by any equality-preferring social welfare 
function (SWF), where SWF is required to be in-
creasing and concave (for additional detail, see 
Maasoumi and Heshmati 2000). However, if this 
is not the case (i.e., both the generalized Lorenz 
curves of distributions C and D continue to cross 
even when µC is greater than µD, which can occur 
if µC is not large enough), then the social welfare 
ranking of C and D will ultimately depend on the 
precise specification of the social welfare func-
tion. In other words, social welfare ranking be-El-Osta and Morehart  Welfare Decomposition in the Context of the Life Cycle of Farm Operators   131 
 
 
tween the two distributions will be determined 
based on the trade-off between more “equality” in 
the distribution of D and the higher “mean” in C. 
  The third tool used to assess the disparity in 
economic well-being among farm households is 
that of the standard Gini coefficient, which has 
the added benefit of allowing for the “cardinal” 
measurement and, consequently, for the disaggre-
gation of SWF by five age cohorts.
7 To accom-
plish this while attending to policymakers’ joint 
concern regarding both equity and efficiency as 
noted by Mukhopadhaya (2001, 2002, and 2003), 
assume the following “Bergson-Samuelson” SWF: 
 
(5)  (,) WW X =θ , 
 
where, in the context of this paper, X and θ are 
both functions of CWB
* (for in-depth detail re-
garding the properties of this function in particu-
lar, and for a discussion on distributional and wel-
fare axioms in general, see Inada 1971, Samuel-
son 1977, Pollak 1979, and Cowell 2007). Speci-
fically, the argument X in (5) is an indicator for 
total 
*
j CWB  representing efficiency, while θ de-
notes a measure of dispersion that represents in-
equity. Accordingly, this augmented SWF must 
satisfy the following: 
 








which indicates that a rise in efficiency will in-
crease social welfare, while a rise in inequality 
will decrease social welfare. Since many social 
welfare functions satisfy the conditions set by (6), 
Sen (1974) highlighted, based on the assumption 
that social marginal utility is inversely related to 
income rank and based on widely accepted axi-
oms, the benefit of using a specialized form of the 
Bergson-Samuelson class of SWF’s, as in 
 
(7)  (1 ) x WG =µ − , 
 
where G is the Gini coefficient.
8 The rate of sub-
                                                                                    
7 This section draws heavily on the works of Johansson (1991, pp. 
22–35), Podder (1993), and Mukhopadhaya (2001, 2002, and 2003). 
8 The social welfare function given in equation (7) has a direct re-
lationship with the ordinal generalized Lorenz curve in equation (4) 
since it is equal to twice the area under the curve itself (see Chatterjee 
and Podder 2002, p. 4). Note that equation (7) could be rewritten as 
stitution between “equity” and “efficiency” at a 
constant welfare level is given by setting the total 
differential of equation (7) to zero: 
 




dW G d d G
Gd d G
= −µ + µ−
= −µ − µ=
 
 
which, in turn, after collecting terms yields the 
slope of an indifference curve of SWF in a space 














  Next is the decomposition of SWF by age sub-
groups, which is done here following Podder 
(1993) and Mukhopadhaya (2002). The method 
starts by dividing the ordered vector  12 , x xx = ,..., 
n x  into five vectors of size n, with each vector 
populated by the values xik corresponding to its 
kth age group while maintaining the initial place-
ment of these values as they were in vector x, 
with zeros being placed everywhere else. Take 
the example of the first vector, x
1, which reflects 
the values of 
*
j CWB for those households whose 
heads are aged 35 years or younger, and where 
the number of households in this group is denoted 
by n
1. Vector x
1 now has n
1 values of 
*
j CWB and  
n – n
1 zeros. Vectors x
2 – x
5 are defined in similar 
fashion, which, when combined with vector x
1 














1 – G = W/µ x, such that 1 – G can be viewed as a measure of equality. 
In the context of this paper, the implication of equation (7) for a given 
value of µx is that a society that is averse to inequality would prefer a 
distribution of CWB
* that has a lower Gini coefficient (G) over one 
that has a higher Gini coefficient. It is important to note, thus, that 
inequality measures other than the Gini coefficient (e.g., Theil index, 
coefficient of variation, etc.) may have very different social welfare 
implications (for more detail, see Xu 2004). As was pointed out by a 
reviewer, the “cardinal” measure of social welfare captured by equa-
tion (7) permits the quantification of improvements in the distribution 
of CWB
* over the time period considered, but only after the form of 
the chosen SWF as described by W [see equation (6)], in comparison to 
other forms, is presumed to be acceptable. 132    October 2009  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
 Let  X
T and X
k denote the total sum of 
*
j CWB  
for the whole population and the total sum of 
*
j CWB  for the kth age sub-group, respectively. 











  Another needed step in the process of decom-
posing SWF by age sub-groups is the construction 
of the concentration coefficient for each of the 
corresponding k vectors (k = 1,…, 5), x
k, denoted 
as Ck. This is in addition to computing the Gini 
coefficient of vector x, which contains the indi-
vidual observations of 
*
j CWB  for the whole popu-
lation of farm households. In this study, Ck is 
computed in the same way as in the case of the 
Gini coefficient (see Pyatt, Chen, and Fei 1980, 
and Lerman and Yitzhaki 1985): 
 
(12)  2cov , ( ) /
kkk
k Cx F x x ⎡⎤ = ⎣⎦ , 
 
where F(x
k) is the cumulative distribution of x
k 
(ranked in a non-decreasing order) and 
k x  is the 
weighted sample mean of x
k, and cov is a co-
variance indicator [for detail regarding the method 
used to estimate F(x
k), see Lerman and Yitzhaki 
(1989)]. 
  The Gini coefficient of all elements of CWB
* 
(see Podder 1993 and Mukhopadhaya 2002), ap-
portioned based on the contribution to inequality 











= ∑ . 
 
  To allow for the weighted decomposition of 
social welfare among farm households by age 
cohorts, X
T and X
k in equation (12) need to be 
presented as follows: 
 
(14)       and     
Tk k k X Nx X N x == , 
 
where  x  is the weighted mean of the whole popu-












is the weighted total number of all farm house-
holds, and N
k is a subset of N reflecting the 
weighted number of households in the kth age 
cohort. Based on this new formulation of X
T and 
X













= ∑ . 
  Replacing the sample unweighted mean µx with 
the weighted sample mean  x , along with utiliz-
ing the expressions in equations (11) and (15), the 
social welfare function delineated in (7) can now 






(1 ) (1 ) (1 )





















where ϕk is considered as the absolute share of 
the kth age cohort in total social welfare. Accord-
ingly, the relative share of the kth age cohort in 









  From a policy perspective, the effectiveness of 
a dollar rise in the total CWB
* of the kth age co-
hort can be assessed based on the following ex-
pression, which denotes the marginal effect of 














  Specifically, if the value of  k ξ  is greater (less) 
than unity, this indicates that a dollar increase in 
the total CWB
* of the kth age cohort will result in 
more (less) social welfare than the effect of the 
dollar rise being spread over the entire society 




The economic unit targeted primarily in the 
analysis is the farm operator household (i.e., ε = El-Osta and Morehart  Welfare Decomposition in the Context of the Life Cycle of Farm Operators   133 
 
 
0, or when economies of scale are assumed infi-
nite), which is similar to what researchers in the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture use to officially 
report the economic well-being status of farm 
families (see Green, Ahearn, and Parker 2008). 
Figure 1 presents an assessment of the extent in 
the disparity in the distribution of CWB
* for farm 
households over the 2001 and 2006 time periods. 
The figure shows, and in both periods, a large gap 
in the shares of CWB
* accrued to households in 
the lowest and highest quintiles, which points to a 
concentrated income-wealth distribution. For ex-
ample, while households in the lowest quintiles of 
the samples held one percent or less of CWB
* de-
pending on the time period considered, house-
holds in the highest quintiles held disproportion-
ate shares, ranging from about 53 percent to 55 
percent. The distribution in 2001 of CWB
* ap-
pears slightly more concentrated than the distri-
bution in 2006. Evidence of this is the 55 percent 
of CWB
* found held by the upper 20 percent of 
farm households in 2001 compared to the 53 per-
cent held by their farm household counterparts in 
2006. 
  Figure 2 shows the Lorenz curves depicting the 
distributions of CWB
* in 2001 and 2006. The fact 
that the first panel of the figure shows the Lorenz 
curve of the CWB
* distribution in 2006 falling 
above its counterpart in 2001 at all ordinates al-
ludes to its “strong” Lorenz dominance, in addi-
tion to demonstrating an apparent slight improve-
ment in the distribution of CWB
* over the two 
time periods.
9 The second panel of Figure 2 
shows the plots of the generalized Lorenz curves 
over the 2001 and 2006 time periods. Because the 
generalized Lorenz curve corresponding to the 
distribution of CWB
* in 2006 is measurably above 
that in 2001 (except in the lower portion of the 
plot where the ordinates of both curves are nearly 
identical), the implication of this is that at each 
percentile (particularly from the 20th onward to 
the 100th) of the distribution, farm households 
have more in terms of the combined income- 
 
                                                                                    
9 It should be noted, however, that the difference in the ordinates of 
the 2001 and 2006 Lorenz curves, as visual inspection of these curves 
reveals, is not likely to be statistically different from zero. Beach and 
Richmond (1985) provided statistical methods to allow for the dis-
cernment of strong dominance among Lorenz curves. Such methods 
were not pursued here since they are beyond the scope of this paper. 
wealth resource than in 2001.
10 This finding in-
dicates that, based on a social welfare function 
with a preference towards equity, the distribution 
of  CWB
* in 2006, with its statistically higher 
weighted mean ($108,907 versus $90,628), is 
considered more desirable than the corresponding 
CWB
* distribution for farm households in 2001. 
Both panels of Figure 2 show, thus, the distribu-
tion of CWB
* in 2006 to be welfare-superior in 
comparison to its 2001 counterpart, based on both 
Lorenz and generalized dominance criterion.
11 
  The disparity in the combined income-wealth 
measure of economic well-being on a per-farm 
household basis is captured in the upper panel of 
Table 2, where the evidence, based on the con-
cept of the Gini coefficient (G), points to a highly 
concentrated yet mildly improving distribution of 
CWB
*. For example, between 2001 and 2006, the 
Gini coefficient of CWB
* for farm households 
declined by a value of 0.029, from a high of 
0.538 to 0.509, which indicates a decline in in-
equality, although lacking statistical significance, 
by 5.4 percent.
12 Over the same time period, the 
decline in inequality was even much milder when 
                                                                                    
10 Careful inspection of the ordinates of these two curves reveals a 
tiny yet barely observable crossing at some lower CWB
* percentiles 
(i.e., those with abscissa values of less than 5 percent). This, however, 
should be interpreted as an anomaly driven by the presence of negative 
values in the distributions of the composite income-wealth measure in 
both 2001 and 2006, with the effect of such presence magnified due to 
the fact that the observations in both samples are weighted. 
11 As one reviewer correctly pointed out, the fact that the distribution 
of CWB
* in 2006 is found to Lorenz-dominate its corresponding distri-
bution in 2001 makes it unnecessary to consider any further point esti-
mates, including the Gini coefficient, to assess the order of inequality 
in these distributions. This is because inequality measures satisfying 
the transfer principle [i.e., when inequality increases (decreases) due to 
a mean-preserving transfer from a poorer (richer) household to a richer 
(poorer) household], as was demonstrated by Atkinson’s seminal work 
(Atkinson 1970), will yield the same ranking as one would have 
achieved based on Lorenz dominance results. That the paper pursues 
measurement of inequality using the concept of the Gini coefficient 
beyond the use of the Lorenz dominance results is due to the fact that 
the main objective of the paper is to conduct welfare decomposition of 
the joint income-wealth distribution in the context of the life cycle. 
12 Statistical significance of difference among all measured statistics 
across the 2001 and 2006 time period is measured at the 95 percent 
confidence level. The estimated 2001 and 2006 Gini values, for exam-
ple, are considered statistically not different if their corresponding 
confidence bands overlap with each other. A study by Xu (2000) 
employed an iterative-bootstrap method in its computation of confi-
dence bands for the generalized Gini indices that were estimated in 
order to evaluate changes of income inequality in the United States 
over time. In this study, standard deviations and corresponding confi-
dence intervals for all of the measured dispersion statistics are com-
puted, and because of the complex multistage design of ARMS, based 
on the jackknife variance estimation method similar to earlier applica-
tions by Milanovic (2002) and Giles (2004) [for more detail, see also 























































Figure 1. Share of Household’s Composite Measure of Economic Well-Being by Quintiles (2001 
and 2006) 
Source: Authors’ calculations and Agricultural Resource Management Survey (2001 and 2006). 
 
 
the economies of scales were allowed to increase 
by means of increasing the elasticity of the scale 
rate ε from a value of 0 to 0.5, and then to 1. For 
example, when ε = 0.5, the decline in the Gini co-
efficient between 2001 and 2006 is measured at 
2.97 percent, with the decline becoming even less 
profound, at only 0.709, when ε = 1. 
  Table 2 also presents the 2001 and 2006 
weighted averages of CWB
* for the whole popu-
lation of farm households and for five age co-
horts, with results pointing to statistically larger 
mean values of CWB
* in 2006 than in 2001 across 
all age groups. These averages, along with the 
corresponding population and CWB
* shares and 
concentration ratios, are statistics needed for the 
apportionment of social welfare based on the age 
of the household head. Findings indicate that 
while the concentration coefficient in both time 
periods is highest when the age of the household 
head is between 55 and 64 years, the mean CWB
* 
is highest for this age group only in 2001 and for 
those in the 65-years-or-older category in 2006. A 
nearly identical trend, in both time periods, in 
terms of higher concentration and higher means 
of CWB
* for households operated by older farm-
ers, is exhibited at the 0.5 and 1.00 values of the 
elasticity of the scale rate ε. 
  Table 3 presents the findings of welfare decom-
position based on five age cohorts. Evidence 
points to a statistically significant increase of 27.6 
percent in total social welfare, from $41,886 in 
2001 to $53,455 in 2006. The improvement in 
social welfare over the period appears to be 
driven mainly by a rise in efficiency in the distri-
bution of CWB
* and not necessarily by a rise in 
equity [see equation (7)]. The rise in efficiency is 
evidenced in the larger mean value of CWB
* in 
2006 than in 2001, while the muted rise in equity 
over the period is due to the insignificant decline 
in the corresponding computed Gini coefficients. 
  For farm households with the age of the head in 
the 45- to 54-year-old category in 2001 and for 
those in the 65-or-older category in 2006, both 
absolute and relative shares of social welfare are 
highest compared to when the age of the head 
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Figure 2. Ordinary and Generalized Lorenz Curves for Composite Measure of Economic Well-
Being (2001 and 2006) 
Source: Authors’ calculations and Agricultural Resource Management Survey (2001 and 2006). 
 
 
this finding, particularly for 2001, is the economic 
importance of these two groups of households in 
relation to the other groups. Specifically, as indi-
cated in Tables 1 and 2, the group of households 
in the 45- to 54-year-old age category in 2001 
accounted for the highest shares (nearly 28 per-
cent) of both the total population of farm house-
holds and the total amount of CWB
*. For house-
holds in the 65-or-older age category in 2006, the 
population and the CWB
* shares, while not the 
highest among all of the age groups (at 27.8 per-
cent and 29.6 percent, respectively), were next to 
the highest, the highest being for the group of 
households in the 55- to 64-year-old age category 
(at 29.3 percent and 30.5 percent, respectively). 
What caused both the absolute and relative shares 
of social welfare for households in the 65-or-
older category in 2006 to exceed, although by a 
small margin, their corresponding values for 
households in the 55- to 64-year-old age category 
is perhaps the higher mean of CWB
* and the 
lower value of the concentration coefficient [see 
equations (16) and (17)]. Results further show an 
exact trend in terms of the impact of the life cycle 
of the operator on the absolute and the relative 
shares of welfare, in 2001 and 2006, when the 
analysis is based on the presence of only some 
economies of scale (i.e., ε = 0.5) or based on the 
absence of any economies of scale (i.e., ε = 1.0). 
  The effectiveness of a dollar rise in the total 
amount of CWB
* for any of the five age cohorts is 
captured in Table 3 by values of  k ξ  exceeding 
unity. Findings indicate that such a rise in CWB
* 
of three groups of households in 2001 (e.g., 
younger than 35, 35–44, or 65 or older) and of 
three groups of households in 2006 (e.g., younger 
than 35, 45–54, or 65 or older) will result in more 
social welfare than the effect of such an increase 
being spread over the whole society. Of these age 
cohorts, and in both 2001 and 2006, the cohort 
where the age of the head is younger than 35 
years old has the highest value of  k ξ , indicating 
the relevance of this group of farm households 
over all others for a policy aimed at improving 
the economic well-being of its members while 
concurrently improving the social welfare of the 
whole population. However, when allowing for 
the size of the farm household to enter into the 
analysis (e.g., when ε = 1), the marginal effects of 
a dollar increase in total CWB
* indicate an 
increase in social welfare, in both periods, if such 
an increase occurred for the three age cohorts 
where the age of the head is younger than 55 
years. The largest marginal effects are found for 
both 2001 and 2006 when the analysis is on a per-136    October 2009  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
Table 2. Averages and Shares of Composite Measure of Economic Well-Being, Shares of 
Population, and Concentration Coefficients by Age Categories and by Various Levels of ε (2001 
and 2006) 
CWB
* ( k x )
a  Population shares [ (%) k NN ] 
Age Categories  2001  2006  2001  2006 
  ε = 0 
Younger  than  35  66,462 (7,865)  86,528 (11,192)  6.73 (1.44)  4.54 (0.59) 
35  to  44  88,667 (8,593)  98,170 (7,782)  18.96 (4.42)  11.64 (1.03) 
45  to  54  90,117 (9,736)  104,997 (5,174)  27.87 (1.97)  26.75 (1.42) 
55  to  64  99,513 (16,626)  113,418 (5,542)  21.77 (3.46)  29.31 (1.58) 
65 or older  91,467  (11,408)  116,068  (4,843)  24.67 (2.84)  27.77 (1.14) 
Total 90,628
b (7,482)  108.907
b (2,021)  100.00 (0.00)  100.00 (0.00) 
  ε = 0.5 
Younger  than  35  43,793 (8,126)  52,326 (6,513)  6.73 (1.44)  4.54 (0.59) 
35  to  44  47,617 (3,652)  53,942 (4,528)  18.96 (4.42)  11.64 (1.03) 
45  to  54  54,559 (6,185)  62,784 (2,878)  27.87 (1.97)  26.75 (1.42) 
55  to  64  67,805 (10,604)  77,445 (3,813)  21.77 (3.46)  29.31 (1.58) 
65  or  older  66,235 (7,852)  86,867 (3,812)  24.67 (2.84)  27.77 (1.14) 
Total 58,281
b (5,101)  72,265
b (1,402)  100.00 (0.00)  100.00 (0.00) 
  ε = 1 
Younger  than  35  31,716 (8,785)  33,971 (4,188)  6.73 (1.44)  4.54 (0.59) 
35  to  44  26,855 (1,781)  31,696 (3,223)  18.96 (4.42)  11.64 (1.03) 
45  to  54  35,155 (3,932)  39,596 (2,015)  27.87 (1.97)  26.75 (1.42) 
55  to  64  47,002 (6,998)  54,417 (2,642)  21.77 (3.46)  29.31 (1.58) 
65  or  older  49,200 (5,498)  66,996 (3,255)  24.67 (2.84)  27.77 (1.14) 
Total 39,393
b (3,576)  50,374
b (1,144)  100.00 (0.00)  100.00 (0.00) 
  CWB
* shares [ (%)
kT XX ]
  Concentration coefficients  () k C  
  ε = 0 
Younger  than  35  4.94 (0.82)  3.60 (0.67)  0.419 (0.121)  0.421 (0.085) 
35  to  44  18.55 (5.23)  10.49 (0.96)  0.516 (0.128)  0.511 (0.055) 
45  to  54  27.71 (2.17)  25.79 (1.71)  0.541 (0.022)  0.478 (0.030) 
55  to  64  23.90 (3.14)  30.52 (2.12)  0.600 (0.085)  0.552 (0.043) 
65  or  older  24.90 (2.96)  29.60 (1.22)  0.514 (0.071)  0.503 (0.021) 
Total  100.00 (0.00)  100.00 (0.00)  0.538
c (0.021)
c 0.509  (0.013)
c 
  ε = 0.5 
Younger  than  35  5.06 (1.14)  3.29 (0.60)  0.441 (0.163)  0.370 (0.086) 
35  to  44  15.49 (4.59)  8.69 (0.83)  0.396 (0.123)  0.404 (0.052) 
45  to  54  26.09 (2.21)  23.24 (1.50)  0.508 (0.023)  0.437 (0.030) 
55  to  64  25.32 (2.96)  31.41 (2.11)  0.632 (0.078)  0.578 (0.041) 
65  or  older  28.04 (3.12)  33.38 (1.38)  0.579 (0.067)  0.578 (0.019) 
Total  100.00 (0.00)  100.00 (0.00)  0.539
c (0.020)
c 0.523  (0.011)
c 
  ε = 1 
Younger  than  35  5.42 (1.65)  3.06 (0.55)  0.518 (0.197)  0.399 (0.076) 
35  to  44  12.93 (3.98)  7.32 (0.82)  0.311 (0.137)  0.373 (0.055) 
45  to  54  24.87 (2.25)  21.02 (1.37)  0.514 (0.024)  0.441 (0.037) 
55  to  64  25.97 (2.83)  31.66 (2.13)  0.660 (0.068)  0.604 (0.038) 
65  or  older  30.81 (3.40)  36.94 (1.63)  0.636 (0.061)  0.641 (0.019) 
Total  100.00 (0.00)  100.00 (0.00)  0.564
c (0.018)
c 0.560  (0.010)
c 
a At 2006 price levels. Also, standard deviations for all estimates are in parentheses and are computed based on the jackknife vari-
ance estimation method. 
b These are the weighted means () x for the whole population. 
c These are the Gini coefficients of the composite measure of economic well-being for the total population. 
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capita basis (i.e., when ε = 1), and when the age 
of the operator is in the 35- to 44-year-old cate-
gory. This finding is not surprising due to the 
lower disparity of CWB
* for households in this 
age group, as indicated by the lower value of Ck 
[see equation (18)]. In addition, households in 
this age group tend to have larger family sizes 
(see Table 2), with their attendant higher eco-
nomic needs. 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
This paper has, first, examined the disparity in 
economic well-being among farm households 
over the 2001 and 2006 time periods, and second, 
has measured and decomposed total social wel-
fare of these households based on five age co-
horts. In accomplishing this, both ordinal (i.e., 
ordinary and generalized curves) as well as “car-
dinal” (i.e., social welfare functions) methods were 
used. The underlying financial and demographic 
information needed for the analysis was obtained 
from the Agricultural Resource Management Su-
rvey (ARMS). 
  Findings based on frequency density and on 
Gini coefficient analyses that allow for the partial 
ranking of the distributions of the combined in-
come-wealth measure (CWB
*) for farm house-
holds revealed declining inequality between 2001 
and 2006, although the decline was not found to 
be statistically significant. Use of the concepts of 
the “Lorenz” and of the “generalized Lorenz” 
curves showed the 2006 distribution of CWB
* to 
be more socially preferred than the corresponding 
distribution in 2001. 
  Results based on Podder’s (1993) method of 
welfare valuation and decomposition revealed an 
improvement in social welfare over the 2001 to 
2006 time period, which appears to be driven 
mainly by a rise in efficiency in the distribution 
of CWB
* and not necessarily by a rise in equity. 
Findings also indicated the importance of the 45- 
to 54-age-group in terms of its contribution to-
wards the total social welfare for farm households 
in 2001, and the importance of the group of farm 
households in the 65-years-or-older age group in 
2006. For both periods, a one-dollar increase in 
the total combined income-wealth of those farm 
households with heads in the younger-than-35-
years age sub-group, in contrast to those in the 
other age sub-groups, is found to produce a larger 
increase in social welfare than the effect of the 
same dollar increase being spread over the entire 
society. When the analysis is based on a per-cap-
ita concept of economic well-being, rather than 
on a per-household basis, a marginal one-dollar 
increase in the total combined income-wealth 
produced in both 2001 and 2006 the largest in-
crease in social welfare, but only when the age of 
the operator is in the 35-to-44 age category. 
  Findings in this paper can be used as a guide to 
determine which group of households could be 
targeted in terms of, among other policy options, 
direct transfers, loan guarantees, redistributive tax 
schemes, or enhanced business opportunities to 
produce economic benefit to the households in 
this targeted group itself while concurrently bene-
fiting society at large. The group of farm house-
holds where the age of the head is younger than 
35 years is the appropriate target when the analy-
sis is done on a per-farm household basis, and the 
group of households where the age of the opera-
tor is in the 35-to-44 age category is the appropri-
ate target when the analysis is carried on a per-
capita basis. 
  For farm households, there are policies in place 
now that provide assistance to those on the ex-
treme of the age cohort. For example, the Farm 
Service Agency (FSA) provides direct and guar-
anteed loans to beginning farmers and ranchers 
who tend to be young and frequently tend to be 
unable to obtain financing from commercial 
credit sources. Among the provisions of the 2008 
farm bill (i.e., the Food, Conservation, and En-
ergy Act) is an increase in the inflation-indexed 
loan limit for an individual beginning farmer from 
$250,000 to $450,000, and competitive grants for 
education, extension, and outreach initiatives. Find-
ings of this paper suggest that future efforts to 
address policies providing assistance to those farm-
ers in the 35-to-44 age group, who tend to have 
already-formed and growing families, with their 
attendant higher livelihood costs, may be the most 
efficient way to maintain a viable farm economy. 
Given the high relative social welfare impacts 
found for the younger and the middle-age farm 
age cohorts, policies that directly address farm-
entry and farm-preservation issues would likely 
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